

policy on personal considerations and a personal hatred for the President of the United States.

Important challenges continue to face us in Yugoslavia. We have got to return the refugees and house them and clothe them and feed them by winter. We have got to avoid partition of Kosovo. We have got to make sure that Milosevic does not receive immunity for his war crimes, and Serbia must not receive international aid until Yugoslavia becomes democratic.

What we have achieved is that NATO has shown it is willing and able to keep the peace in Europe. Until now they have been a defensive alliance. For the first time they have had to act militarily, and they have succeeded, they have prevailed, and they will keep the peace in Europe.

The central question here all this century has been do free peoples in democracies have the self-discipline to prevail against dictatorships and all the coercive power they can bring to bear? In this century we have answered that question affirmatively, in two world wars, in the Cold War, and now in Yugoslavia.

It is no time to step back. Support the Skelton amendment.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS), the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding me time.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is not only prudent but part of a vital duty for this Congress to continue to discuss national security and policy questions relating to our ongoing operations in Kosovo. As part of this debate, I believe we must take a longer view of our foreign policy goals using lessons learned in this current crisis. In a nutshell, what does our intervention in Kosovo imply for our foreseeable future as the world's dominant power? And we are.

Consider that NATO attacked a sovereign country that offered no military threat to the members of the alliance. Consider that NATO justified its attack on the basis of morality rather than self-defense, and NATO limited the accuracy and effectiveness of its attack to those measures that presented the least risk to NATO participants, even though this format predictably caused innocent civilians' deaths.

Where do these actions as a precedent take us? Who else has the "right" to mount such an attack? China? Russia? The Organization of African Unity? Some other power? Some rogue Nation?

Where else should NATO attack? The principles of morality have no geographic boundaries. We know that. For every ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, there will be several more, in Africa,

Indonesia, any other headline you want to pick in the paper. How can NATO not intervene in the next Liberia, Rwanda or East Timor?

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How committed are we to such attacks? Have standoff smart bombs become NATO's version of diplomatic demarche? Is this what we do every time negotiations stall at the bargaining table?

Underlying all these questions is the one most fundamental: What effect do such activities have upon our national security? I have, as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, seen a divergence of the intelligence capabilities and assets towards the Balkans that has left much of the intelligence field elsewhere empty.

What then is the end game for this and for future Kosovos? What is the lesson?

I have two recommendations on how to get there. First, I suggest we look with the wisdom of hindsight at the role of NATO in attacks other than for self-defense. I believe that the citizens of NATO countries support our purely humanitarian operations outside our territory, but I have less assurance that after the bloodshed on the ground in Yugoslavia, they will so readily support a military attack outside our territory unless it is in clear self-defense.

Second, I urge that any future interventions never again leave our national security, the United States of America, so vulnerable to surprise and to compromise. We must not allow such efforts to leave us vulnerable to unanticipated crises with our friends or with our adversaries.

We must, in short, have an intelligence and national security structure sound enough and broad enough to handle any such matters as Kosovo, if that is what the future portends, and still stand watch around the world in defense of our national security, which is the number one purpose, the number one duty, and the number one objective of our military.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, the critics were wrong. The headline in today's paper says, "Kosovo Pullout to Start Today." NATO's 11-week, 78-day campaign to stop the genocidal policies of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo is producing the results we sought. Today's pullout is the first step towards a complete victory.

As William Kristol and Robert Kagan wrote this week in the Weekly Standard, the victory in Kosovo should send a message to would-be aggressors that the United States and its allies can summon the will and force to do them harm.

Syndicated columnist William Safire hit the nail on the head when he wrote recently, "International moral standards of conduct, long derided by

geopoliticians, now have muscle," said Bill Safire. Why? Because of NATO's unified, unwavering action in Kosovo.

The threat of a NATO ground invasion had a decisive impact on the butcher of Belgrade. Not surprisingly, Milosevic capitulated as President Clinton consulted his military advisers on options for ground troops.

Like the cowardly bully who picks on the weak and defenseless, Milosevic caved when he knew there would be no escape. President Clinton's resolve on the Kosovo crisis has enhanced the credibility of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance throughout the world.

Finally, let me state, our efforts to secure a peace in the Balkans are not over. Milosevic has properly been branded as a war criminal by the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, and he must be held accountable. Our credibility has been enhanced, NATO has been strengthened, a brutal dictator has been repulsed, and the cause for human rights has been advanced. If those are not good causes, I do not know what are.

In that context, Mr. Chairman, I urge that we adopt the Taylor amendment, I urge that we adopt the Skelton amendment, and I urge that we reject the Souder and Fowler amendments, which will declare defeat, not victory, which is appropriately our task today.

Mr. Chairman, the doomsayers and the critics were wrong. The banner headline on today's Washington Post says it all: "Kosovo Pullout Set To Start Today."

NATO's 11-week, 78-day air campaign to stop the genocidal policies of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo is producing the results we sought.

Today's pullout is the first step toward complete victory.

Soon we will be able to count these as our accomplishments:

Success in providing the 1.3 million Kosovars who have been forced to flee their own country or displaced within the province with a safe re-entry to their homeland.

Success in stabilizing this most unstable region of Europe.

And, of utmost importance, success in vindicating the credibility of NATO—and the United States—in rejecting and punishing Milosevic's unbridled barbarism.

As William Kristol and Robert Kagan wrote this week in the Weekly Standard: the victory in Kosovo should "send a message to would-be aggressors that . . . the United States and its allies can summon the will and the force to do them harm."

With the Serb invaders retreating and the NATO peacekeepers ready to restore order, it's not too soon to consider the lessons in this campaign and what still must be done.

First, NATO's air campaign in Kosovo decisively demonstrates that the alliance can engage in military action to protect basic human rights and to deter aggression on the European continent.

This policy is not just the right thing to do—it's a strategic imperative.

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